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Doing Minority Justice Through Procedural Fairness: Face Veil Bans in Europe 
Saïla Ouald Chaib* and Eva Brems** 
We all move through our lives, a lot of the time, wrapped in a fog of our own 
selfish aims and desires, seeing other people as mere instruments of those 
desires. Kant thought, plausibly, that we need good principles to address this 
ubiquitous failing. But we need something else as well, the habitual 
cultivation of a displacement of mind, a curious, questioning, and receptive 
demeanor that says, in effect, “Here is another human being. I wonder what 
he (or she) is seeing and feeling right now.” This curiosity needs to be fed by 
facts: for without correct historical and empirical information we can’t 
possibly answer such a question. But it needs something more, a willingness 
to move out of the self and to enter another world.
1
  
 
The French and Belgian bans on face veils in public places have been subjected to 
strong substantive human rights critiques. This article takes a complementary 
approach, examining the bans from the perspective of procedural fairness. 
Indeed, the French and Belgian bans are extreme examples of legislative 
processes taking place above the heads of the people concerned, neglecting 
the ban’s possible human rights impact. After exploring what the social 
psychology notion of procedural fairness entails for the judiciary and the 
legislator, especially in a multicultural context, this article details procedural 
fairness shortcomings with respect to the face veil ban in France and Belgium. 
Subsequently, the article sets out how the European Court of Human Rights might 
compensate for these shortcomings. 
Key words: Face veil bans, Human Rights, Procedural Justice, Freedom of religion, 
European Court of Human Rights. 
 
In the name of women’s rights, public security and social cohesion, two European countries, France 
and Belgium, have enacted laws prohibiting face covering in the public space, generally known as 
‘burqa bans’.
2
 These bans have been strongly criticized as violations of religious freedom and 
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discriminations on grounds of religion and sex.
3
 Complementing such substantive human rights 
critiques, this paper takes a different approach, examining the bans from the perspective of 
procedural fairness. Indeed, the French and Belgian bans are extreme examples of legislative 
processes taking place above the heads of the people concerned. Not only was the voice of the 
women concerned missing in the debates, even more striking was the fact that a discussion of the 
ban’s human rights impact was nearly non-existent.  
In a first section, we will refer to social psychology research to explain what procedural fairness 
encompasses and what it entails for both the judiciary and the legislator, particularly in a 
multicultural context. Next, we will demonstrate how the French and Belgian authorities have 
neglected procedural fairness at the domestic level. In the third section, we will argue how the 
European Court of Human Rights, if confronted with the subject matter, might restore procedural 
fairness. 
 
 
1. Procedural Fairness and Minority Justice  
 
Procedural fairness or procedural justice refers to the fairness of the procedures by which a decision 
is taken or by which an outcome is arrived at in a case. Social psychology research has shown that in 
their fairness assessment of authorities and the law, people tend to accord more importance to 
procedural fairness than to distributive justice.
4
 In other words, the way people are treated by judges 
and authorities is more relevant to them than the particular outcome in their case or the policy 
                                                           
3
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4
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decision taken. This does not mean however that the outcome is considered irrelevant.
5
 Procedural 
fairness and distributive justice should be seen as mutually strengthening approaches rather than 
substitutes.
6
  
 
1.1. Importance of Procedural Fairness  
 
Initially, procedural justice research focused on the question of compliance with the law. Tyler and 
his associates found that the legitimacy of an authority shapes compliance and that legitimacy is 
rooted in procedural fairness judgments.
7
  Hence, the first reason for authorities to accord particular 
importance to procedural fairness is maintaining their own legitimacy and that of the law. Central to 
the idea of legitimacy is the belief that "some decision made or rule created by [the] authorities is 
'valid' in the sense that it is 'entitled to be obeyed' by virtue of who made the decision or how it is 
made".
8
  As a consequence, procedural fairness also enhances cooperation with authorities.
9
 It can 
also be argued that when a human rights body such as the European Court of Human Rights is 
involved, the importance of procedural justice is even more important ‘because it is part of the value 
system they represent’ and because the legitimacy of human rights law is at stake.
10
 
Moreover, it promotes social cohesion and individual well being. Research has consistently shown 
that “[p]eople … value fair treatment by legal authorities because it communicates a message about 
their identities— that they are respected and valued members of society”
11
 and that they can count 
on the authorities for protection, benevolence and consideration when needed.
12
  
                                                           
5
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6
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Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly, 35 (2013), p. 182. 
7
 Tyler, Tom R., Why People Obey The Law (Princeton University Press, 2006), 270. 
8
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9
 Idem, 271. 
10
 Brems and Lavrysen “Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The European Court of Human 
Rights”, p. 185. 
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Although it follows from Tyler’s research that procedural fairness is equally important to majority 
populations as to minorities
13
, there are several reasons to believe that procedural fairness is 
particularly crucial for minority justice. 
Firstly, overcoming minority members’ above-average distrust of authorities
14
 may require particular 
vigilance on procedural fairness.
15
 Secondly, perceptions of social standing in the society gain a 
special significance for minority members.  When certain people, e.g. youth, minorities or people 
with disabilities are treated unfairly, authorities might be sending the signal that these groups are 
marginal in society.
16
 In contrast, by treating minority individuals fairly the authorities convey a 
message of inclusion among the valued members of society.  
 
1.2. Components of Procedural Fairness 
 
Tyler and others highlight four criteria, according to which people evaluate procedural fairness: 
participation, trustworthiness, neutrality and respect.
17
 
Participation, frequently called 'voice', represents the need of people to be able to express their own 
perspective, regardless of whether or not their voice will have an impact.
18
 Valuing participation 
requires moreover that people feel that their views are genuinely considered.
19
 Judges can show this 
                                                           
13
 Tyler, Huo, Trust in the Law, p. 152; Burke, Kevin and Leben, Steve, “Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in 
Public Satisfaction”, White paper for the American Judges Association (2007), 18; Tyler, Tom R, “Public Trust 
and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and 
Legal Institutions?”, Behavioral Sciences and the Law (2001), p. 217 (with references) 
14
 Tyler, Why People Obey The Law, p. 270, Tyler, Huo, Trust in the Law, pp. 142-146; Tyler, “Public Trust and 
Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal 
Institutions?”, p. 217; Levi, Margaret,  Sacks, Audrey and Tyler, Tom, “Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring 
Legitimating Beliefs”,  American Behavioral Scientist 53(3) (2009), p. 369.  
15
 See also Ouald Chaib, Saïla, “Suku Phull v. France Rewritten from a Procedural Justice Perspective: Taking 
Religious Minorities Seriously” in Diversity and European Human Rights: Rewriting Judgments of the ECHR, Eva 
Brems (ed.) (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 221. 
16
 Tyler, Why People Obey The Law, p. 176. 
17
 See for example Tyler, “Procedural Justice and the Courts”, 30. 
18
 Ibid. and Burke and Leben, “Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction”, p. 11-12. 
19
 Tyler, Why People Obey The Law, p. 149 and 276. 
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by referring to parties’ arguments in the judgment and carefully examining the merits of the case.
20
 
When people are confronted with an authority with which they have less direct contact, such as a 
legislator, direct voice is less important.
21
 Yet that does not make participation irrelevant. People still 
expect their interests to be taken into account.
22
 For minorities this might be of additional relevance 
since the "underrepresentation of a group in the legislature (...) may reduce the group members' 
sense of ownership, increase their sense of injustice and partiality in the determination of policy, and 
dampen their obedience to authority".
23
  
Trustworthiness refers to authorities’ intentions. They must be sincere and caring.
24
 The question at 
hand is whether authorities are making an effort to be fair
25
 and people will evaluate whether they 
“are being honest and open about the basis for their actions; are trying to do what is right for 
everyone involved, and are acting […] not out of personal prejudices”.
26
   
Neutrality requires judges to be honest and unbiased about the applicant and the case and to base 
their decision upon rules and on objective information about the case and on the arguments of the 
parties instead of personal assumptions.
27
 Neutrality requires also transparency about the way 
decisions are taken and how the rules are applied.
28
 It also involves consistency across people, over 
time and across cases.
29
 For lawmakers, neutrality requires that the interests of the whole population 
are taken into account. All views should be considered and no one view should be granted an 
obvious advantage in the policy debate.
30
 It may be argued that particular caution should be paid to 
this when minorities are not represented in legislative bodies. Therefore, in our view, it is important 
                                                           
20
 Brems and Lavrysen “Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The European Court of Human 
Rights”, 186. 
21
 Gangl, “Procedural Justice Theory and Evaluations of the Lawmaking Process”, p. 136.  
22
 Levi, Sacks and Tyler, “Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs”, p. 360. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Tyler, “Procedural Justice and the Courts”, p. 31. 
25
 Tyler,  “What is procedural justice?: Criteria used by citizens to assess the fairness of legal procedures”, p. 
129 en Tyler, Why People Obey The Law, p. 164. 
26
 Tyler, “Procedural Justice and the Courts”, p. 30 
27
Ibid.  and Tyler, Why People Obey The Law, p. 164.  
28
 Tyler, “Procedural Justice and the Courts”, p. 30 and Burke and Leben, “Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient 
in Public Satisfaction”, p. 6. 
29
 Tyler, “Procedural Justice and the Courts”, p. 30 and Ouald Chaib, “Suku Phull v. France Rewritten from a 
Procedural Justice Perspective, p. 223. 
30
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that lawmakers be sufficiently informed on minorities’ interests and needs when enacting legislation 
that affects them. In fact, neutrality also requires accuracy: informed decisions based on accurate 
information.
31
  
The final criterion, respect means that people‘s human dignity is not infringed and that authorities 
treat them in a polite and respectful way.
32
 This criterion is particularly relevant for individuals’ 
feeling of self-worth, as mentioned above.
33
  
 
 
2. Denial of Procedural Fairness at the Domestic Level  
 
The kick-off of the French ‘burqa ban’ process was a speech by President Nicolas Sarkozy on 22 June 
2009, stating that face veils were not welcome in France, and that legislation was necessary “to 
protect women from being forced to cover their faces and to uphold France's secular values”.
34
 The 
French Parliament subsequently initiated an inquiry into the issue, led by MP André Gerin. The 32 
member Gerin Commission represented all parliamentary groups. It heard witnesses and experts, 
and sent out questionnaires to several French Embassies. Its January 2010 report concluded that the 
face veil constituted an infringement of the three principles constitutive of the French Republic: 
liberty, equality and brotherhood. The majority of the commission therefore recommended that 
Parliament adopt a resolution proclaiming this, as well as a law banning the face veil in public spaces. 
On 11 May Parliament unanimously adopted said resolution.
35
 This paved the way for the ban. In the 
                                                           
31
 Tyler, Tom R., “Governing amid diversity: Can fair decision-making procedures bridge competing public 
interests and values?”,  Law and Society Review, 28, (1994), p. 824. 
32
 Burke and Leben, “Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction”, p;7; Tyler, Why People Obey 
The Law, p. 152; see also Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance, (Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 65. 
33
 Idem, p. 129. 
34
 Gabizon, Cécilia, “Sarkozy : ‘la burqa n'est pas la bienvenue’”, Le Figaro, 26 June 2009, 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2009/06/23/01002-20090623ARTFIG00055-sarkozy-la-burqa-n-est-pas-la-
bienvenue-.php (Last consulted on 31/10/2012, our translation). 
35
 Résolution no. 2272 réaffirmant la prééminence des valeurs républicaines sur les pratiques 
communautaristes et condamnant le port du voile intégral comme contraire à ces valeurs, Assemblée 
nationale.  
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summer of 2010,
36
 the bill passed in both houses of Parliament with an overwhelming majority, 
despite negative advice of the Council of State, which estimated that “no incontestable legal basis” 
could be provided for a general ban.
37
 The Constitutional Council however declared the ban to be 
constitutional in October 2010, with only a minor reservation for places of worship open to the 
public.
38
  
In Belgium, the ‘burqa ban’ debate took place at a time of severe political crisis. Shortly after the 
near-unanimous approval
39
 of a ban by the Chamber of Representatives, the government fell 
prematurely and Parliament was dissolved on 7 May 2010. As the Senate had ‘evoked’
40
 the bill, this 
meant that the newly elected Parliament had to start over. While political negotiations for a new 
coalition government were going on for more than a year, the ban was adopted fast, without referral 
to the Council of State for advice. This time the Senate did not evolke the bill, which was approved by 
the Chamber of Representatives with an overwhelming majority
41
. In Belgium too, the law was 
unsuccesfully challenged before the Constitutional Court, also with a minor reservation for places of 
worship.
42
   
A closer look at the processes in both countries reveals serious shortcomings with respect to several 
procedural fairness requirements. 
 
2.1. Accuracy 
 
                                                           
36
 In the lower house the bill received 335 ayes, only 1 nay, and 221 abstentions (13 July 2010). In the Senate 
there were 246 ayes, 1 nay, and 100 abstentions (14 September 2010). 
37
 “Etude relative aux possibilités juridiques d’interdiction du port du voile integral”, Rapport Assemblée 
générale plénière du Conseil d’Etat, 25 March 2010. 
38
 French Constitutional Council, 7 October 2010, no. 2010-613 DC. 
39
 More specifically it concerned 136 ayes, 0 nays and 2 abstentions.  
40
 The majority of legislative proposals in Belgium are ‘optionally bicameral’. Regarding such proposals, the 
governing principle is that the Chamber of Representatives has the authority to approve a bill autonomously 
but the Senate has the right to ‘evoke’ the approved bill and discuss it. This so-called ‘right of evocation’ must 
be invoked within a certain term and it requires a minimum number of members. 
41
 In the plenary Chamber, there were 129 ayes, 1 nay and 2 abstentions. 
42
 Belgian Constitutional Court, 6 December 2012, no. 145/2012. 
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Accuracy is an aspect of the neutrality of the law.
43
 This means simply that the law has to be based 
on information that is correct. In this respect, both the Belgian and French ‘burqa ban’ laws are 
seriously flawed. Several commentators have noted that in the legislative process, no evidence was 
adduced that would allow to identify the exact problem the law would remedy, nor to support the 
claim that the specific remedy – i.e. the ban- would be effective with respect to that problem.
44
 The 
Belgian and French legislators were rather well tuned in with majority sentiments vis-à-vis the face 
veil, yet they were working on erroneous assumptions concerning the profiles and experiences of 
women wearing the face veil.
45
 The central error is the assumption that all –or nearly all- women 
who wear the face veil are forced or pressured to do so. Since the adoption of the bans, empirical 
research based on interviews with face veil wearers in France
46
 and Belgium
47
 has shown that in fact 
the main profile is that of women choosing to wear the veil as a matter of an individual spiritual 
journey, generally against opposition of their family and in many cases of their partner as well. This is 
consistent with research in the Netherlands
48
 and Denmark,
49
  that was available at the time of 
                                                           
43
  T. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law, p.119, referring to the criteria developed by G.S. Leventhal, “What 
should be done with equity theory?” in Social exchange: Advances in theory and research, Gergen, Greenberg 
and Weiss (eds.) (New York: Plenum), 1980, 27-55. 
44
  Leane, Geoffrey W.G., “Rights of ethnic Minorities in Liberal Democracies: Has France Gone too far in 
Banning Muslim Women from wearing the Burka?”, HRQ 33 (2011), p.1053; Hunter-Henin, Myriam, “Why the 
French Don’t Like the Burqa: Laïcité, national Identity and Religious Freedom”, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 61(3) (2012), p. 613; Nanwani, Shaira, “The Burqa Ban: An Unreasonable Limitation on Religious 
Freedom or a Justifiable Restriction?”, Emory International Law Review 25 (2011), p. 1464. Cf. on the 
Netherlands: van Sasse van Ysselt, Paul, “Over het verbod op het dragen van een gezichtssluier en van andere 
gelaatsbedekkende kleding”, Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 2010 (1), p. 7. 
45
  For an extensive discussion of the erroneous assumptions of the Belgian legislator as confronted with 
empirical reality, see Brems, Eva, Janssens, Yaiza, Lecoyer, Kim, Ouald Chaib, Saïla, Vandersteen, Victoria and 
Vrielink, Jogchum, “The Belgian ‘Burqa Ban’ Confronted with Insider Realities”, in The Face Veil in Europe Inside 
and Out, Brems, Eva (ed.) (forthcoming). 
46
  Open Society Foundations, “Unveiling the Truth; Why 32 Muslim Women Wear the Full-Face Veil in 
France”, 2011, at http://www.soros.org/publications/unveiling-truth-why-32-muslim-women-wear-full-face-
veil-france.  
47
  Brems, Eva, Janssens, Yaiza, Lecoyer, Kim, Ouald Chaib, Saïla, Vandersteen, Victoria, “Wearing the Face 
Veil in Belgium; Views and Experiences of 27 Women Living in Belgium concerning the Islamic Full Face Veil and 
the Belgian Ban on Face Covering”, 2012, at http://www.ugent.be/re/publiekrecht/en/research/human-
rights/faceveil.pdf.  
48
  Moors, Annelies, “Gezichtssluiers; Draagsters en Debatten”, Amsterdam, 2009, at http://www.e-
quality.nl/assets/e-
quality/dossiers/Moslimas/Onderzoek%20Gezichtssluiers%20draagsters%20en%20debatten.pdf. (Consulted on 
31/10/2012)  
49
  “Rapport om brugen af niqab og burka”, Institute of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, University of 
Copenhagen, 2009, at www.e-pages.dk/ku/322/. (Consulted on 31/10/2012).  
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lawmaking. Moreover, an expert testified before the Gerin commission that the wearing of the face 
veil in France was a matter of ‘religious hyper-individualism’ in which women choose to submit to a 
religious rule.
50
 The finding that the assumption of coercion is wrong renders moot at least two of 
the arguments used by both legislators to justify the ban. The first is the argument based on 
women’s rights. If women are not forced to wear the veil but instead freely choose to do so, the bans 
instead of liberating women, curtail their autonomy. Moreover they strengthen stereotypes about 
Muslim women’s subordination. In both ways, the bans work against women’s rights. The second is 
the argument about social integration. When donning the face veil is a well-considered choice, many 
women will not consider abandoning it as a first option when confronted with the ban. They prefer 
instead to continue wearing the veil yet avoid going out in public except by car.
51
 For these women, 
the bans reduce social integration. Moreover, empirical research also questions the relevance of the 
third argument in the parliamentary debates, which is based on security concerns. It appears in fact 
that face veil wearers are generally willing to lift their veils for identity checks, in many cases even to 
male security personnel.
52
 
The fact that the legislators literally had no idea what they were dealing with,
53
 thus had important 
consequences for the impact of the ban.  Disregarding essential evidence in the course of lawmaking 
is highly problematic; it is even more so when it concerns legislation restricting fundamental rights. In 
Belgium, the disregard seems deliberate, as Parliament insisted on moving fast, and in that spirit 
rejected both a request for the hearing of experts who could have advanced evidence, and requests 
for an advice of the Council of State, who could have checked whether the proponents of the ban 
advanced sufficient evidence to support their arguments. In France however, the Gerin Commission 
                                                           
50
  Gérin, André, “Rapport d’information fait en application de l’article 145 du règlement au nom de la 
mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national”, 26 January 2010, p. 
469. Cf. also Amghar, Samir, “Le ‘niqâb’ pour s’affirmer?”, 2 January 2010, at http://www.ceras-
projet.org/index.php?id=4196. (Consulted on 31/10/2012) 
51
   Brems et al., “Wearing the Face Veil in Belgium; Views and Experiences of 27 Women Living in 
Belgium concerning the Islamic Full Face Veil and the Belgian Ban on Face Covering”. 
52
  Ibid. 
53
  About the Netherlands: Witteveen, Willem, “Montesquieu en het boerkaverbod”, 20 May 2010, at 
http://njblog.nl/2010/05/20/montesquieu-en-het-boerkaverbod/. (Last accessed on 31/10/2012) 
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auditioned 211 persons and produced a 658 page report. Yet the same flaws occurred. One of the 
auditioned experts suggests that an erroneous presentation of reality may have been brought in 
through the analyses of some of his colleagues, as they were set on an ideological reading of the face 
veil and on interpreting it as a sign of domination and alienation of Muslim women.
54
 
Moreover neither the French Constitutional Council nor the Belgian Constitutional Court did anything 
to correct this flaw.
55
 Both had the power and the opportunity to require the government to advance 
evidence as to its correct assessment of the problem the legislation sought to address, and of the 
ban’s likelihood to remedy that problem. Yet, the French Council chose to only reiterate the 
legislator’s assumptions that the face veil could endanger public security and the minimal 
requirements of living together and that women wearing a face veil, “whether voluntarily or not” are 
in a situation of exclusion and inferiority that is manifestly incompatible with the constitutional 
principles of liberty and equality.
56
  
The Belgian Constitutional Court did a slightly better job with regard to accuracy, acknowledging both 
that no security problem involving face covering occurred yet in Belgium
57
, and that the face veil can 
be a manifestation of a well-considered choice
58
.  Nevertheless it accepted the ban as necessary for 
security reasons as well as for reasons of gender equality. With regard to the former, the Court 
argued that the State was allowed to “anticipate” potential risks.
59
 As to the gender argument, the 
Court stated that regardless of free choice, the principle of gender equality justifies a ban on religious 
manifestations that are not reconcilable with the principle of equality between men and women.
60
 
Thus, although the Court does bring nuance to the legislator’s general assumptions, these nuances 
do not affect the reasoning whatsoever. With regard to the social integration argument however, the 
                                                           
54
  Amghar, Samir, “Niqab, quels sens pour celles qui le portent?”, Le Monde des Religions 40 (2010). 
55
  Davis, Britton, “Lifting the Veil: France’s New Crusade”, B.C.Int’l & Comp.L.Rev. 34(1) (2011), p.139-
140. 
56
 French Constitutional Council, 7 October 2010, no. 2010-613 DC, 4. , 
57
 Belgian Constitutional Council, 6 December 2012, no. 145/2012, B 20.2. 
58
 Idem, B 23. 
59
 Idem, B 20.3 
60
 Idem, B 23. 
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Belgian Constitutional Court fully endorsed the role of speculator when stating that covering the face 
renders an essential element of a person’s individuality invisible, making life in society impossible.
61
   
 
2.2. Neutrality/Sincerity/Transparence 
 
For lawmakers, the requirement of neutrality comes close to those of sincerity and transparence. It is 
about being clear on the purpose of the legislation, and seriously striving to best achieve that 
purpose. In the case of conflicting interests between different categories of people affected by the 
law, it is also about taking the interests of all categories equally seriously. 
Both the French and Belgian laws ban face covering in general, even though the legal history and the 
accompanying discourse make clear that they target the Islamic face veil specifically. The neutral 
wording is intended chiefly to avoid legal challenges of discrimination on grounds of religion. Yet it 
goes at the expense of sincerity and transparence. Both the Belgian and French legislators have been 
accused of hypocrisy for disguising the real objective of the law.
62
 The legislators ’desire to ‘appear 
impartial and reasonable’
63
  extended to the parliamentary debates, where parliamentarians avoided 
as much as possible mentioning Islam. Following French president Sarkozy’s statement in his speech 
to parliament in 2009, that ‘the burqa is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience’, politicians 
have gone out of their way to describe the face veil as a matter of culture, not religion.
64
 
Furthermore, commentators of the French Gerin Commission and the ensuing legislative process 
have alleged bias in the selection of the persons to be auditioned
65
 as well as in the interpretation of 
                                                           
61
 Idem, B 21. 
62
  Delgrange, Xavier, “Quand la burqa passé à l’Ouest, la Belgique per-elle le Nord?”, in Quand la burqa 
passé à l’Ouest. Enjeux éthiques, politiques et juridiques, Roy, Olivier and Koussens, David (eds.) (Rennes: 
Presses universitaires de Rennes (Forthcoming, 2013), p. 35.; Hunter-Henin, “Why the French Don’t Like the 
Burqa: Laïcité, national Identity and Religious Freedom”, p. 617. 
63
  Winet, Evan D., “Face-Veil Bans and Anti-Mask Laws: State Interests and the Right to Cover the Face”, 
Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 35 (2012), p. 244. 
64
  Cf. in the Netherlands, Moors, Annelies, “Minister Donner as Mufti: New developments in the Dutch 
‘burqa debates’”, September 2011, at http://religionresearch.org/martijn/2011/09/21/minister-donner-as-
mufti-new-developments-in-the-dutch-%E2%80%98burqa-debates%E2%80%99/. (Last accessed 31/10/2012)  
65
  Krivenko, Ekaterina Yahyaoui, “The Islamic Veil and its Discontents: How do they Undermine Gender 
Equality”, Religion and Human Rights 7 (2012), p. 20-21. 
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the information from the auditions by the Commission. It was noted that the final report erased the 
plurality of reasons explaining the practice of the face veil that were advanced at the Commission’s 
hearings.
66
 Moreover, it can be argued that parliamentarians interpreted the Gerin report in a 
selective and biased manner, as in addition to a ban, the report also proposed a number of positive 
measures related to sensitization, mediation, respect for diversity and the rejection of discrimination, 
none of which were taken up in the political work that followed the report.
67
 
The French Council of State is not beyond criticism from the angle of neutrality. It was the Council 
that came up with the novel concept of ‘non material public order’,  ‘a minimum base of reciprocal 
requirements and guarantees that are essential to life in society and that… are so fundamental as to 
precondition the exercise of other liberties’.
68
 Even though the Council of State advised against the 
use of this concept, it became one of the main foundations of the ban.  Critics have argued that this 
concept, also labeled ‘social public order’ is far from neutral, as it allows ‘to sweep away human 
rights whenever their manifestation is offensive to the majority of citizens’.
69
 
For courts, neutrality requires that judges act as “neutral, principled decision makers who make 
decisions based upon rules and not personal opinions.”
70
 This relates to perceptions of independence 
and impartiality of the judge, as well as to the equal treatment of all parties. In that respect, the 
French Constitutional Council, acting as a court in controlling the constitutionality of legal texts, has a 
problem. The Council is composed of political notables, including leading “conservative politicians 
who had taken vocal and often controversial stances on anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant campaigns 
and who were unlikely to obstruct a government close to their leanings”.
71
 By hardly motivating its 
approval of the face covering ban, the Council left itself “unprotected to the criticism that it is not 
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much more than a semi-political organ”.
72
 Similar reasoning has been applied to the Belgian 
Constitutional Court, half the bench of which are former politicians, making it unlikely that it would 
dare criticize a law adopted with near unanimity.
73
 Although the Belgian Constitutional judges 
motivated their decision more thoroughly, the reasoning remained one-sided giving quasi-absolute 
weight to the State’s arguments instead of balancing the interests of all the parties. 
74
 
 
2.3. Participation 
 
In the process of lawmaking, individuals cannot expect to be heard in person.
75
 Yet individuals 
belonging to a group that is directly affected/targeted by a law have a legitimate expectation that 
their side of the story is somehow on the table. Moreover, substantive participation requires some 
evidence that these people’s views have been considered by the decision maker.  
This is yet another procedural fairness component that has been seriously neglected by the French 
and Belgian lawmakers who banned the face veil. Empirical research in Belgium has shown that 
women wearing the face veil experience intense frustration at the fact that this political intervention 
in their lives took place without consulting them or researching their situation.
76
 Moreover, several 
suggested that if there had been a dialogue, a compromise could have been found, for example 
wearing a veil in a different colour than black to cause less offense, or taking alternative measures for 
easy identification.
77
 It is indeed arguable that this is a matter in which dialogue might lead the way 
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to the best solution for all; or that at least dialogue should have been tried before resorting to the 
criminal law.
78
 
 Yet as shown above, the lawmakers were not really interested in information from the perspective 
of the face veil wearers. During the massive information gathering effort that was the French Gerin 
Commission, the idea of talking to a woman who wears the face veil came as an afterthought. Kenza 
Drider, the only face veil wearer who was heard by the Commission, states that she had written 
several letters to Mr. Gerin asking to appear before the Commission, and that she had to mobilize 
her media contacts in order to succeed. During her hearing, summarized in ten lines in the 658 page 
report, she had to unveil her face.
79
 Moreover, the Gerin report starts with an ‘avant-propos’, in 
which a member of the commission relates the one encounter he had with a (French) woman 
wearing the face veil, which was on a professional trip to Syria. According to the text the woman 
approached him because she wanted to explain the meaning of her face veil. The melodramatic text 
describes the scene in much detail and concludes that “the eyes of Farah from Marseille” were a 
source of motivation for the commissioners. Yet it remains mute on the content of her message. 
80
 
This is symptomatic of the whole report, and by extension of the entire lawmaking process that took 
place: the perspective of the women concerned was systematically shoved off the table.
81
 This is all 
the more remarkable given the fact that both Belgium and France have a strong tradition of 
consulting with target groups in the run-up to lawmaking.
82
 The derogation from democratic custom 
in this specific case cannot go unnoticed, neither by the women themselves, nor by the population at 
large. 
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2.4. Respect 
 
Treating people with respect means taking them and their concerns seriously, and treating them as 
valued members of society.
83
 Under this heading, at least three issues are cause of concern in the 
face veil banning process. 
The first has been called “a neo-colonial form of paternalism”.
84
 The Belgian and French legislators 
claim to want to liberate women wearing a face veil, yet they are not interested in the viewpoints of 
these women. They pretend to know better than them why they wear what they wear.
85
 Throughout 
their discourse, they picture these women as submitted, dependent creatures. The legislators thus 
deny these women autonomy. Moreover, the legislators dwell extensively on how the majority in 
society experience the encounter of a face veil or even the idea of a face veil, yet show no interest in 
knowing how women who wear it experience their encounters with others. They thus ignore the 
women behind the veil, denying them humanity. 
In the second place, the legislators do not take seriously the infringement they are creating into a 
fundamental right, i.e. the freedom to express one’s religion. They consistently downplay the 
religious factor, despite the fact that for most women who wear the face veil, the central reason for 
doing so is a deep religious commitment. Even more importantly, they go lightly about tampering 
with a fundamental right. This is evidenced most clearly in the blatant ignoring of the advice of the 
French Council of State, and in the refusal to consult the Belgian Council of State. In addition to the 
legislator, the French Constitutional Council did not appear to take religious freedom seriously. It 
needed only one sentence to conclude that the face veil ban did not violate religious freedom: 
                                                           
83
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Taking into account the objectives he stated for himself as well as the nature of the sanction 
in case of breach of the rule, the legislator adopted provisions that guarantee a conciliation of 
the protection of public order and the protection of constitutional rights that is not manifestly 
disproportionate.
86
 
Even with the finest legal scalpel, it is hard to detect any reasoning or justification in these lines. This 
is the more striking, given the fact that the Council of State had earlier come to the opposite 
conclusion in an extensively motivated advice. The Constitutional Council did not even bother to 
brush the Council of State’s arguments aside. Moreover, it adds insult to injury when it stipulates an 
exception to the ban: in order not to violate religious freedom, the French ban should not apply in 
places of worship that are open to the public.
87
 As this statement is likewise unmotivated, we cannot 
know whether the Council is deliberately reinterpreting a religious dress practice to make it into part 
of a mosque ritual, nor on what basis it claims the power to do so. The same holds for the Belgian 
Constitutional Court, which stipulated the same reservation in its judgment.  Thirdly, the discourse 
surrounding the introduction of the bans shows a strong tendency of ‘othering’
88
. Women who wear 
a face veil are not portrayed as members of the same society as those who encounter them on the 
street, and those who decide to ban the veil. Nicolas Sarkozy set the tone when he announced that 
“the burqa will not be welcome on the French territory” (cf. supra). This speech has been analysed as 
an example of ethnonationalism: by labeling the face veil as foreign to French identity, there is no 
acknowledgement of the possibilities of a hybrid or multilayered identity, that would at the same 
time be profoundly French and profoundly Islamic.
89
 Moreover, Sarkozy’s ‘colonial gaze’ at the face 
veil mobilizes the French around self-proclaimed French values while excluding the face veil wearers 
from both those values and the idea of Frenchness.
90
 Mullally noted that the Gerin Commission’s 
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presentation of its proposals as ‘un accord républicain’ clearly reflects “the desire to reinforce and 
bolster a collective sense of national identity, designed to define the terms of belonging.”
91
 It 
deliberately targets those who symbolize otherness. Stigmatization, if not intentional, is at best 
accepted as collateral damage.
92
 The main purpose of the ban seems to be “to reassure public 
opinion that the political class is ready to stand up for ‘our’ values in the face of ‘foreign’ threats to 
‘our way of life’.”
93
 
 
 
2.5. Trust/caring 
 
The criterion of trust relates to the feeling among those affected by the law, that those who are 
making the law sincerely strive for justice.
94
 It is about the lawmakers showing to the people that 
they care. From this angle as well, the French and Belgian face veil bans are very problematic. 
To the extent that the lawmakers in the face veil banning process show caring, it is caring about the 
majority population, for whom the face veil may engender feelings of insecurity, who dislike the sight 
of a face veil on the street, and who see the face veil as a symbol denying women’s rights. The 
arguments advanced by both parliaments to ban the veil – women’s rights, security, and social 
cohesion – make sense only from the (subjective) perspective  of those who do not wear the face 
veil. As argued above, for the face veil wearers the bans have reduced women’s rights, social 
integration and security.  This lack of caring for the women concerned is most flagrant in the Belgian 
law, as – different from the French law – it does not include a stipulation against forcing a person to 
cover her face. While the authors of the ban were assuming that women wearing the face veil are 
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coerced to do so, they apparently did not care enough about these women to punish the 
perpetrators. Manifestly the only problems the lawmakers cared about are those of the majority 
population. 
An even more cynical interpretation is one that does not see any evidence of sincere caring by the 
lawmakers, except for their own electoral gain. Such is the suggestion among commentators who 
point at the fact that the bans enjoyed wide popular support, and that those supporting them 
politically would surf to similar popularity on waves of populism and islamophobia.
95
  
At a more institutional level, the refusal of the Belgian lawmakers to hear experts or consult the 
Council of State, or the anti-discrimination watchdog,
96
 or even to seriously engage with any 
arguments against the ban,
97
 can be seen as evidence of lack of caring, in the sense that the focus on 
getting a ban voted, left no room for even the most common efforts aimed at doing things in a 
proper way. It was quite clear that the parliamentarians did not want to have to deal with criticism. 
One of the main proponents of the ban explicitly stated that the reason for avoiding the Council of 
State was the fear that it might find inconsistencies with fundamental rights. In other words, in their 
hurry to get the ban voted, politicians did not even care about fundamental rights.
98
 
In France, the Council of State was consulted, yet the picture does not look any rosier. The Council 
crushed the proposed ban on grounds of incompatibility with fundamental rights. Similarly, the legal 
experts heard by the Gerin commission had warned that a general ban would be highly 
problematic.
99
 In an ‘unprecedented defiance of concerted legal opinion’
100
 however, the French 
parliament ignored these objections, and several MPs engaged in public court-bashing against the 
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Council of State,
101
 signaling that if they cared about anything, it was not the rule of law or 
fundamental rights. 
 
 
3. Doing Procedural Minority Justice in Strasbourg 
 
As was to be expected, an application challenging the French face veil ban was brought before the 
European Court of Human rights.
102
 This is an opportunity for the Court to set the standard on 
procedural justice as well as substantive justice.  In the analysis below we will explore how the Court 
could potentially realize the former. 
 
3.1. Assessing Domestic Procedural Fairness  
 
Throughout its case-law, the European Court of Human Rights regularly acts as a watchdog of 
domestic procedural fairness. In this respect it has evaluated decision making processes by domestic 
courts, administrations and lawmakers. It is noteworthy that the Court has paid attention to this in 
cases involving the rights of members of ethnic or religious minorities, even when it exercised only 
light scrutiny.  
In particular, in cases involving article 8 – the provision that protects a minority lifestyle,
103
 as well as 
dealing with numerous issues of specific relevance for minorities, such as housing
104
 and registration 
of ethnic identity
105
— the Court has regularly stated that “the decision-making process leading to 
measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect for the interests of the 
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individual as safeguarded by Article 8.”
106
 Moreover, the Court emphasized the minority component 
in its famous dictum in Chapman, a case concerning a Gypsy’s right to live in a caravan on her land: 
“the vulnerable position of Gypsies as a minority means that some special consideration should be 
given to their needs and their different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory planning framework 
and in reaching decisions in particular cases”.
107
 A fine example of this, is the case of Noack v 
Germany,
108
 concerning the collective transfer of the  —mostly minority – inhabitants of a village to 
allow for mining expansion. The Court found the complaint manifestly ill-founded, basing its decision 
mostly on the elaborate procedures at the domestic level. The Court noted in particular that the 
process “lasted several years and that the distinctive feature of that process was the wide debate 
that took place in the Parliament of the Land of Brandenburg and among the other leading figures in 
public life regarding the choice between three alternative lignite-mining projects.”
109
  It also drew 
attention to the due consideration of minority concerns during the process: “As regards protection of 
the rights of the Sorbian minority, the Court notes that ... the Constitutional Court of the Land of 
Brandenburg carefully examined whether the legislature had understood the scope of Article 25 § 1 
of the Constitution of the Land of Brandenburg, which protects the rights of the Sorbs, whether it 
had duly weighed the right it enshrined against other fundamental rights and whether the result was 
not disproportionate.”
110
 
Under article 9 – protecting religious freedom— the Court, in its famous Grand Chamber case of 
Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, examined the way in which the Turkish headscarf ban for university students 
was introduced. In particular, it noted that the university authorities explained the reasons behind 
the ban to the students,
111
 and that “the process whereby the regulations ...were implemented took 
several years and was accompanied by a wide debate within Turkish society and the teaching 
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profession ... It is quite clear that throughout that decision-making process the university authorities 
sought to adapt to the evolving situation in a way that would not bar access to the university to 
students wearing the veil, through continued dialogue with those concerned”.
112
 Hence, the broad 
margin the Court left to national authorities to decide whether or not to ban headscarves in school, 
was to some extent compensated by a control of the domestic process. However, this type of 
procedural fairness assessment is far from systematic in the European Court’s case-law. 
Following Brems and Lavrysen,
113
 it is submitted that the control by the European Court of Human 
Rights should always include an appreciation of the extent to which procedural fairness has been 
done at the domestic level. Serious shortcomings of procedural fairness in cases involving Convention 
rights should systematically lead to the finding of a violation. Smaller shortcomings should be put in 
the balance with the other elements in the overall assessment of whether an infringement 
constitutes a violation. Moreover, the degree of scrutiny exercised by the Court could be linked to 
procedural fairness criteria, in the sense that light scrutiny – granting a wide ‘margin of appreciation’ 
to domestic authorities – would not be applied in case of procedural fairness flaws.  Moreover, in 
cases involving minority rights, the procedural fairness check should include due attention paid to 
minority concerns. 
Dealing with the French and/or Belgian face veil banning processes, the European Court of Human 
Rights would therefore be expected to point out the numerous and very serious procedural fairness 
shortcomings, and remind the states parties of proper practice.  Moreover, it would have to exercise 
strict scrutiny at the European level so as to compensate for the absence of domestic procedural 
fairness.  
 
3.2. Doing it Right at the European Level  
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In addition to setting the standard on domestic procedural fairness, we submit that the Court in its 
own work should strive for best practice in this field. This would both strengthen its credibility when 
criticizing domestic shortcomings and offer states parties concrete examples of procedural fairness in 
legal reasoning. Moreover, from applicants’ perspective, fair treatment by this highest body in the 
hierarchy of law can offer some compensation for procedural unfairness suffered in earlier stages. 
 
a) Recognizing the  Applicant 
 
The issue of voice is crucial for the European Court’s treatment of the face veil case. As it examines 
the case from the starting point of the fundamental right at stake, the right holder’s perspective 
comes natural to the Court. Throughout its reasoning, the Court should take care to present 
sufficient and accurate information on her experiences and to accurately present her arguments. 
While the applicant’s perspective is centerpiece, information on the experiences of other face veil 
wearers provides a relevant contextualization. 
Assuming that the applicant in SAS v. France corresponds to the ‘standard profile’ of face veil wearers 
in France, it is to be expected that her religious conviction is a crucial aspect of the insider 
perspective.
114
 The way a conviction is experienced and the importance accorded to it is subjective. 
Outsiders may not understand why a Sikh objects to removing his turban at a security check or why it 
might not be evident for a Muslim girl to remove her headscarf during sports classes. Similarly, 
outsiders may not understand why a woman decides to cover her face when appearing in public. In 
determining whether or not such behaviour falls under the European Convention, it is however the 
insider perspective that counts. It is not for the Court to determine what a religion prescribes or does 
not prescribe.
115
 Only the applicant-believer can autonomously decide this for herself. In most of its 
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case law, the Court has adopted a correct approach to this matter: the relevant question is whether 
the applicant finds a particular practice important in the context of her religion or belief.
116
  
The ECtHR recently clarified in Eweida e.o. v. the UK that “the existence of a sufficiently close and 
direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief must be determined on the facts of each 
case. In particular, there is no requirement on the applicant to establish that he or she acted in 
fulfilment of a duty mandated by the religion in question”.
117
  Accordingly, the autonomy of the 
believer implies also that it does not matter whether the religious dictate she wants to follow 
consists of a minority view within her religious group.
118
  
Additionally, in light of the neutrality principle, the Court must refrain from making biased or 
generalizing statements about the applicant’s religious conviction or practice. In the past, the Court 
has made a number of problematic statements such as “the rites and rituals of many religions may 
harm believers’ well-being, such as, for example, the practice of fasting, which is particularly long and 
strict in Orthodox Christianity, or circumcision practiced on Jewish or Muslim male babies”
119
 or 
“wearing the Islamic headscarf could not easily be reconciled with the message of tolerance, respect 
for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society 
should convey to their pupils”
120
. Such statements in fact contradict the ruling that 
“(T)the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any 
discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used 
to express such beliefs are legitimate.”
121 122
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In addition, such statements are stigmatizing
123
 and disrespect the plurality of meanings a certain 
religious expression can have
124
 as well as individual autonomy to choose what meaning to attach to 
a certain religious expression.
125
 Instead of taking part in the political debate about the meaning 
society imposes on the face veil the Court has with SAS v. France the opportunity to break the circle 
of prejudice and return to the essence of the issue at stake, namely the rights of the women 
concerned and their right to freedom of religion in particular.
126
  
b) Recognizing the Weight of the Applicant’s  Right 
In the domestic debates surrounding the face veil bans the impact of the bans on freedom of religion 
was hardly put on the table. It is the Court’s task to redress procedural justice by considering the 
voice of all parties and by genuinely weighing the arguments against each other as prescribed by the 
second paragraph of article 9 ECHR.
127
 Procedural fairness requires moreover that this balancing 
exercise is done in a transparent manner, clarifying the weight given to each argument, as well as the 
underlying reason. Unfortunately the Court’s adjudication in article 9 cases has often lacked clarity 
and consistency, in contrast with its case law under other provisions, such as freedom of 
expression.
128
 From a procedural fairness perspective, the Court should be careful not to create the 
impression that some rights are more valued than others.
129
 Although the Court describes in its case 
law the freedom of religion as “one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of 
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believers and their conception of life”,
130
 in practice, the reasoning adopted in freedom of religion 
cases often shows a less understanding approach, especially when the individual aspect of the right is 
concerned.
131
 The Court’s case law in the headscarf cases is well known for its one-sided approach, 
heavily relying on principles put forward by the State such as secularism and neutrality.
132
 But also in 
other cases concerning religious accommodation claims the Court has often shown a lack of 
understanding of the importance of religious claims for applicants in a particular situation.
133
 In 
Francesco Sessa v. Italy
134
 for example, the Court stated that a lawyer complaining about the 
scheduling of a hearing on a Jewish holiday, should arrange for replacement by a colleague if his 
religious and professional duties enter into conflict.
135
 It did not seriously consider the possibility that 
the organization of the judicial system might accommodate respect for his religious duties. In other 
cases, such as the cases concerning security measures in public buildings – requiring taking off 
religious dress —, the Court simply refers to the importance of security measures, omitting to 
examine the necessity of the measure for security.
136
 This insensitive approach towards religious 
claims should be avoided by carefully considering the concerns of the applicant and by genuinely and 
thoroughly balancing the interests at stake. Good practices can be found in the cases, rare in their 
kind, of Jakobski v. Poland
137
 and Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey
138
 and the recent case of Eweida and others 
v. the UK
139
.  
c) Recognizing the Applicant’s Minority Position  
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As argued above, procedural fairness is particularly important when a minority is involved. That 
authorities should make an extra effort to keep confidence of minorities, was acknowledged by the 
Strasbourg Court in a recent case concerning racist violence towards Roma.
140
 When the Court 
examines legislation interfering with minority rights, it has an important corrective function of 
“protecting the rights of minority members against abuses of the majority rule by the dominant 
group."
141
 Indeed, there is always a risk that "law-making is done on the basis of dominant 
assumptions about minority cultures and their members’ views, with the minority being treated as a 
silent interlocutor".
142
 When it comes to the face veil ban, the Court cannot overlook the fact that the 
discussion concerned a minority that was silenced in the debates.
143
 Moreover, face veiling women 
are in a particular vulnerable position since they consist of a small minority within the minority group 
of Muslims who are not necessarily supportive towards them.
144
   
Some authors argue that the debates surrounding the face veil bans were so heated, because women 
wearing a face veil represent the Islam Europe does not want to see.
145
 It cannot be denied that the 
face veil bans are rooted in an anti-Islamic climate in Europe, and that this legislation even risks 
reinforcing the existing tensions. This has been extensively documented amongst others by Amnesty 
International,
146
 by the former Council of Europe Commissioner for human rights Thomas 
Hammarberg,
147
 by the European monitoring Centre on racism and Xenophobia,
148
 and by the 
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Organization of the Islamic Conference.
149
 Also, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
issued a resolution on “Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe” in which the face veil bans were 
discussed as well.
150
 In the recommendation with the same name, the Assembly called on member 
states not to establish a general ban of full veiling.
151
 The Court should recognize this “sensitive 
nature of the situation”
152
 in which hostility and discrimination towards Muslims is on the rise in 
many European countries.
153
 
All these factors point at the particular vulnerable position of women wearing the face veil in France. 
In addition to close attention to neutrality and balancing in the Court’s reasoning, they mandate 
specific care with respect to its discourse. Respect should characterize the way the Court talks about 
women wearing the face veil, and all forms of paternalism and ‘othering’ should be avoided.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Procedural fairness is an important and useful concept for all types of situations in which individuals 
encounter the law. Its particular strength lies in its empirical basis in social psychology research, 
demonstrating the importance of procedural fairness for the legitimacy of legal authorities as well as 
for individual wellbeing.  There are good reasons to state that procedural fairness merits particular 
attention in cases of minority justice. Moreover, it may be argued that best practice of procedural 
fairness is of particular importance when fundamental rights are at stake.  
Our examination of the far-reaching procedural fairness flaws in the parliamentary and judicial 
treatment of the Belgian and French face veil bans has shown that disregard of procedural fairness 
makes for bad and harmful law. It is bad law, because it is not fit to address real problems: lack of 
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attention to participation, accuracy and neutrality have led to crucial errors in the identification of 
problems as well as remedies. It is moreover harmful law, because it results in stigmatization and 
violations of the very rights it proclaims to protect.  
The European Court of Human Rights is well placed to lead the way toward procedural fairness as a 
necessary twin of substantive fairness in human rights adjudication. While the Court’s case-law 
shows a number of instances in which it has violated crucial procedural fairness principles, it also 
shows a potential to play a role in both reviewing domestic procedural justice and leading through 
example. The upcoming face veil case of SAS v France will be an excellent opportunity for the Court 
to show both its willingness and its capacity to do so. 
 
 
